The absences at China’s top political meeting signal not just corruption but a systemic failure of governance at the highest levels
Reading the Empty Seats
In a political system where seating arrangements, attendance records, and the sequence of names on official documents are all laden with meaning, the empty seats at the opening of China’s top annual political meetings in March 2026 spoke volumes. Zhang Youxia, China’s highest-ranking general and a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, was not present among the 23-member Politburo at the opening of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Ma Xingrui, the former party secretary of Xinjiang and a full Politburo member, had not been seen in public since October 2025. A third vice-national-level official, CPPCC Vice Chairman Chen Wu, was also absent — and had not attended a CPPCC chairman’s meeting since April 2025.
Three vice-national-level officials absent from a meeting of the country’s governing elite. Three more of the 24 people who sat at the absolute apex of power in the world’s most populous nation — gone, disappeared, or under investigation. The People News analysis of the Two Sessions documented the full scale of the absences and the ripple effects radiating outward from each fallen official.
The Machinery of Disappearance
Understanding how senior CCP officials disappear requires understanding the party’s standard playbook for managing elite purges. The process typically begins with the target’s gradual absence from events they would normally attend — a Politburo study session here, a plenary meeting there. Then comes a period of neither confirmed presence nor confirmed investigation, during which officials closely associated with the target begin to be quietly removed from their own positions. Finally — sometimes months later, sometimes years — comes the official announcement of investigation, expulsion from the party, or criminal prosecution.
In the case of Ma Xingrui, whose last public appearance was at the Fourth Plenum in late October 2025, the cascade of associated purges has been sweeping. Officials connected to him have been removed across Xinjiang’s political system, in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, in Guangdong’s political circles, and in the aerospace and military-industrial sector where he previously worked as director of the China National Space Administration. His former secretary in Shenzhen was removed from his position as Guangdong Provincial Standing Committee member in December. His former aide was reassigned to a ceremonial post in January 2026.
The Numbers That Tell the Story
The institutional damage is visible in the attendance records themselves. The 14th National People’s Congress originally had 2,878 deputies. At the preparatory meeting on March 4, only 2,761 were present — 117 absent. The NPC Standing Committee had announced the termination of 19 deputies the previous week, including nine military representatives. On March 2, the CPPCC Standing Committee announced the removal of 13 more members due to disciplinary investigations. Of the original 2,169 CPPCC members, only 2,078 actually attended.
These are not normal attrition rates for any legislative body in any country. They reflect a Communist Party elite that is, in a very real sense, consuming itself. The Freedom House assessment of China documents year after year that the absence of accountable governance produces exactly this outcome: without external checks on power, internal struggles become the only mechanism for managing elite conflict, and those struggles grow progressively more destructive as the supreme leader’s tolerance for any independent power base approaches zero.
Who Rises in the Vacuum
The pattern of purges and promotions under Xi Jinping has produced a new elite whose defining characteristic is not bureaucratic competence, regional legitimacy, or factional balance — the considerations that shaped promotion under previous CCP leadership systems — but personal loyalty to Xi himself. The officers and officials who replace the purged are those who have demonstrated most visibly and most vocally that their careers depend entirely on Xi’s continued favor.
The promotion of Zhang Shengmin to CMC vice chairman following the removal of both previous holders of that position exemplifies the pattern. Zhang’s record as head of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission — essentially the military’s anti-corruption enforcement body — makes him a figure whose entire career has been built on implementing Xi’s purge apparatus. He is the right person, in Xi’s eyes, to hold the second position in China’s military command: not because he is the most capable military commander available, but because he is the most reliable enforcer of the system that has produced the current crisis.
The Historical Parallel
Students of Chinese political history will recognize the pattern. The concentration of personal power, the elimination of institutional checks, the replacement of professional competence with personal loyalty as the primary criterion for advancement — these were the conditions that produced the Cultural Revolution, in which Mao Zedong’s unchecked authority enabled a decade of catastrophic political violence that consumed an entire generation of Chinese institutional capacity. Xi’s purge is not as destructive as the Cultural Revolution. But its structural logic is disturbingly similar.
That parallel is not lost on China’s own population, however carefully censored the discussion remains. The pro-democracy movement that built Hong Kong into one of Asia’s most dynamic societies understood that accountable government is not a luxury but a necessity — that the question of who checks the power of the powerful is the most fundamental question in politics. The empty seats at the Two Sessions are a reminder of what happens when no one can.
Hoi Lam
Lifestyle, Gender & Society Journalist, Apple Daily UK
Contact: hoilam@appledaily.uk
Hoi Lam is a lifestyle and society journalist whose work focuses on gender issues, family dynamics, and everyday social change within Chinese and diaspora communities. She completed her journalism education at a leading Chinese journalism school, where she specialized in feature writing, interview techniques, and ethical storytelling.
Her reporting career includes contributions to Apple Daily and other liberal Chinese magazines and newspapers, covering topics such as women’s rights, work-life balance, generational change, and evolving social norms. Hoi Lam’s work is grounded in firsthand interviews and contextual research, ensuring authenticity and factual integrity.
She brings newsroom experience in balancing human-interest storytelling with rigorous fact-checking and responsible framing. Her writing avoids sensationalism and prioritizes accurate representation of sources and lived experiences.
Hoi Lam’s authority is reinforced by sustained publication within reputable media outlets and compliance with editorial review and correction standards. She is trusted by editors for her careful handling of sensitive subjects and ethical clarity.
At Apple Daily UK, Hoi Lam contributes credible, experience-based journalism that documents social realities with accuracy, empathy, and professional discipline.
