The arrests of Zhang Youxia and the disappearance of Ma Xingrui expose the CCP’s deepening internal crisis
Empty Chairs at the Top of Communist Power
When China’s highest-ranking general and a former Xinjiang party boss both failed to appear at the opening of the annual Two Sessions in early March 2026, the absences were impossible to ignore. Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and the PLA’s most senior officer, was not among the 23-member Politburo at the opening ceremony of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on March 4. Ma Xingrui, once the Communist Party’s top official in the western region of Xinjiang, was also absent — and had not been seen in public since October 2025.
Their disappearances represent the latest and most dramatic developments in an anti-corruption campaign that has now consumed more than a hundred senior PLA officers since 2022, according to analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The scale and pace of the purge are, by any historical measure, extraordinary.
Zhang Youxia: The Fall of China’s Top General
Zhang Youxia was placed under investigation in January 2026, according to the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. He served alongside Xi Jinping as co-vice chair of the Central Military Commission, the body that commands China’s entire military apparatus. His removal reduced the CMC to just two functioning members: Xi himself and newly promoted Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin.
Zhang’s downfall followed that of He Weidong, the other CMC vice chair, who was expelled from the Communist Party for corruption in October 2025. Together, the removal of both CMC vice chairs represents what analysts have called a “near-complete decapitation” of China’s military high command. In practical terms, Xi Jinping now controls the CMC with no meaningful institutional counterweight — a concentration of military authority without precedent in the post-Mao era.
Ma Xingrui: The Xinjiang Boss Who Vanished
Ma Xingrui’s case follows a pattern familiar to watchers of CCP elite politics. Before his rise through regional party structures in Guangdong and Xinjiang, he served as director of the China National Space Administration and as vice minister of industry. His last confirmed public appearance was at the Communist Party Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum in late October 2025. Since then, he has been absent from a Politburo study session, the annual Central Economic Work Conference, and multiple high-profile events.
The ripple effects of Ma’s apparent downfall have been sweeping. Officials connected to him have been purged across Xinjiang’s political system, in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, in Guangdong’s political circles, and even in the aerospace and military-industrial sectors where he previously worked. On February 28, 2026, an official described as one of his former associates became the first senior official to fall in what analysts were calling a new wave of investigations.
The Hollowed-Out Legislature
The scale of the purge has visibly damaged the credibility of the meetings themselves. The 14th National People’s Congress originally had 2,878 deputies. At the preparatory meeting on March 4, only 2,761 were present — 117 absent. The CPPCC, originally comprising 2,169 members, saw only 2,078 actually attend its opening, with 47 unaccounted for. The NPC Standing Committee had announced the termination of 19 deputies in late February, including nine military representatives. Three days later, the CPPCC Standing Committee announced the removal of 13 more members due to disciplinary investigations.
These are not normal numbers. They reflect a Communist Party elite that is consuming itself. The Freedom House annual report has long documented how authoritarian systems use anti-corruption campaigns not to advance rule of law but to eliminate political rivals. The pattern in China under Xi Jinping fits that template almost perfectly: the purges are real, but their purpose is absolute loyalty to Xi rather than institutional integrity.
A Warning from Within
Observers inside and outside China have noted that the timing of the Two Sessions purge announcement, combined with the striking institutional absences, represents a deliberate message from Xi to the remaining elite. No position is safe. No relationship, no matter how long-standing, provides immunity. The removal of sitting Politburo members — individuals who were among the most powerful people in a country of 1.4 billion — is a reminder that Xi’s authority is total and his tolerance for any perception of disloyalty is zero.
That may look like strength. In reality, it is a form of institutional decay. A military and political system in which officers advance by demonstrating absolute personal loyalty to the supreme leader, rather than by developing genuine professional competence, is a system that is becoming progressively less capable of executing the complex operations it is tasked with. The CSIS report on the PLA purge noted that the two major military exercises China conducted around Taiwan in 2025 were “hastily organized” and “lacking a thorough, comprehensive plan” — a direct consequence of the chaos at the top of the PLA command structure.
Xi Tightens His Grip — And Weakens His Own System
The great paradox of Xi Jinping’s China is that his relentless drive for personal control is steadily undermining the institutional capacity of the state he leads. A Communist Party that cannot hold a legislative session without dozens of empty seats, a military that cannot plan an exercise without weeks of improvisation, an elite so fearful of investigation that officials refuse to put their names to public documents — these are not the characteristics of a confident, rising power. They are the symptoms of a political system in crisis.
The people who live under that system — including the millions in Hong Kong who once had the freedoms that Beijing is now methodically stripping away — deserve better than the spectacle of a purge dressed up as governance. Democracy is not a Western imposition. It is the universal aspiration of people who want their leaders to be accountable to them, rather than to a single man with the power to make generals disappear.
Man Yi
Opinion & Social Commentary Journalist, Apple Daily UK
Contact: manyi@appledaily.uk
Man Yi is a journalist specializing in social commentary and analytical reporting, with a focus on interpreting social trends through evidence-based analysis. She received formal journalism training at a top Chinese journalism school, where she studied media ethics, social research methods, and opinion writing standards.
Her work at Apple Daily and other liberal Chinese publications includes analysis of social movements, cultural shifts, and public discourse, grounded in verifiable facts and historical context. While her writing engages interpretation, it remains anchored in documented evidence and transparent sourcing.
Man Yi brings newsroom experience in maintaining clear separation between opinion and factual reporting, an essential component of editorial trust. Editors rely on her disciplined approach to citation, contextual framing, and ethical commentary.
Her authority comes from sustained publication within established media institutions and adherence to editorial guidelines governing opinion journalism. At Apple Daily UK, Man Yi contributes responsible, experience-informed commentary that enhances public understanding without sacrificing accuracy or trustworthiness.
