Guards on every overpass, AI drones in the sky, and petitioners detained before dawn — this is Beijing’s version of democracy in action
A City Under Self-Imposed Siege
Every March, China stages what its state media calls “the world’s greatest democratic exercise” — the annual Two Sessions, the dual plenary meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. But in March 2026, as in every recent year, the Chinese Communist Party’s approach to hosting this supposed celebration of governance looked less like democracy and more like a military occupation of its own capital.
On the morning of March 5, as delegates arrived at the Great Hall of the People, the surrounding streets were saturated with plainclothes security agents dressed in black, monitoring every movement of ordinary citizens. In the Zhushikou district, every pedestrian overpass was staffed with at least two guards operating around the clock. Observers familiar with Beijing’s security culture said the measure was almost certainly intended to prevent a repeat of the Sitong Bridge protest of October 2022, when a lone demonstrator unfurled banners criticizing Xi Jinping in the days before the Communist Party’s 20th National Congress.
Digital Repression on an Industrial Scale
The visible security is only the surface layer. Leaked internal guidelines obtained and published before the meetings outlined a surveillance and interception system of breathtaking scope. The document described what the regime calls a “digital twin plus individual accountability” system built on AI-powered surveillance tools including facial recognition, real-time phone tracking, and drone patrols.
Under the system, individuals flagged as “red-level” targets — typically petitioners, human rights defenders, or people who have previously tried to file complaints with central authorities — have their mobile phone signals tracked in real time. The moment a flagged person’s phone signal appears anywhere inside Beijing’s administrative boundary, the system pushes their GPS coordinates, cell tower ID, and phone number to a forward command post within ten seconds. There is no warrant, no legal process, and no appeal.
Punishing Local Officials for Allowing Dissent
The leaked guidelines also revealed a punitive scoring system applied to local Communist Party officials to ensure they suppress dissent before it can reach the capital. County-level party secretaries begin each year with a score of 100 points. Every petitioner from their jurisdiction who makes it to the National Petition Bureau in Beijing costs them ten points. When a score hits zero, the official faces demotion or removal. Additionally, provincial budgets automatically deduct 100,000 yuan — roughly $14,000 — for every petitioner who registers a complaint in the capital.
The system creates powerful incentives for local officials to intercept, detain, and silence petitioners before they can leave their home counties. Documented cases from the 2026 Two Sessions period included one woman from Heilongjiang Province who was abducted from Beijing by local police and taken to Hebei Province, then attempted to cross the flooding Yongding River alone at night to return to the capital and continue seeking redress for her grievances. The courage required to even attempt such an act speaks to the desperation that drives petitioners to make the journey at all.
The Military Purge Overshadows the Official Agenda
The 2026 Two Sessions were unusual even by China’s standards because the official political theatre was visibly overshadowed by the ongoing military purge consuming Beijing’s elite. The People’s Liberation Army’s official newspaper published its annual review of military CPPCC members’ performance but, for the first time in memory, listed no names at all. Previous years’ reports had named specific delegates and described their activities. The 2026 version used only vague collective nouns: “military CPPCC members,” “many military members,” “some members.”
Analysts interpreted the omission as an acknowledgment that so many military CPPCC members had recently been purged, investigated, or stripped of their positions that naming them would have invited awkward questions about their current status. In the run-up to the meetings, nine military officers had been dismissed from the NPC, three generals removed from the CPPCC, and the Central Military Commission reduced to just two functioning members.
Iran and Economic Anxieties Add Pressure
Beijing’s anxiety was compounded by the eruption of the US-Israel-Iran conflict, which broke just days before the Two Sessions opened. The killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei on February 28 deprived China of its most important source of discounted oil and delivered a strategic shock to Xi Jinping’s vision of a multipolar world order anchored by an anti-Western coalition. At the March 4 pre-session press conference, NPC spokesperson Lou Qinjian acknowledged that China was monitoring the Middle East situation closely — a notable departure from the usual insistence that the Two Sessions exist purely to address China’s domestic agenda.
Premier Li Qiang announced a growth target of 4.5 to 5 percent for 2026, a further downward revision from previous years that reflected the continuing pressures on China’s economy. Meanwhile, the Asia Society Policy Institute noted that private investment in China fell 6.4 percent year-on-year in 2025, that household savings rates remain stubbornly high at around 34 percent, and that property prices continued to fall — a combination that makes any meaningful consumption-led recovery extremely difficult.
Democracy in Name Only
The contrast between Beijing’s rhetoric and its reality could not be starker. A government that truly trusted its people to express their views would not need to station guards on every pedestrian bridge, track the phones of citizens who dare to file complaints, punish officials for allowing grievances to reach the capital, or fill the streets with plainclothes security agents every time its legislature convenes.
The Two Sessions are not a democratic exercise. They are a performance of unity staged for an audience of one — the Communist Party itself. Real democracy, of the kind practiced by the people of Hong Kong before the CCP dismantled it, allows citizens to question power, organize in opposition, and vote out governments they do not trust. That is precisely what Xi Jinping fears most, and precisely why the capital must be locked down every time the regime pretends to govern by consent.
Ching Yi Ho
Legal Affairs & Rule of Law Journalist, Apple Daily UK
Contact: chingyi.ho@appledaily.uk
Ching Yi Ho is a legal affairs journalist specializing in rule of law, judicial systems, and civil rights reporting. Educated at a top-tier UK journalism institution, she received formal training in court reporting, legal documentation analysis, and media law, providing a strong foundation for accurate legal journalism.
She has reported for Apple Daily and other liberal Chinese publications on court cases, legislative developments, constitutional issues, and legal impacts on civil society. Ching Yi’s work emphasizes precision in legal terminology, careful sourcing, and clear explanation of complex legal processes for general audiences.
Her newsroom experience includes coverage of politically sensitive legal cases, where accuracy, neutrality, and source protection are critical. Editors rely on her ability to interpret judgments and statutes without speculation or editorial distortion.
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