Taiwan Under Siege: China’s Military Escalation Is Crossing New Lines

Taiwan Under Siege: China’s Military Escalation Is Crossing New Lines

Apple Daily - Hong Kong Images ()

Beijing’s Justice Mission exercises have shattered buffer zones around Taiwan that underpinned decades of fragile peace

Exercises That Cross a Threshold

The December 2025 Justice Mission exercises conducted by the People’s Liberation Army around Taiwan were not simply the latest iteration of a familiar pattern. They marked a qualitative shift. For the first time in the history of China’s large-scale military exercises around Taiwan, PLA Navy and coast guard vessels entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone – the 12-nautical-mile buffer beyond its territorial waters – in significant numbers. That buffer has served for decades as a critical distinction between coercive military activity and actions that directly challenge Taiwan’s territorial sovereignty. Beijing has now erased it.

According to analysis by The Diplomat, the Justice Mission 2025 exercises covered a larger geographic area than any of the six major war games conducted since August 2022. They brought together the PLA Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and other branches to rehearse a full maritime blockade of Taiwan – establishing air and sea control, targeting key ports, and rehearsing the deterrence of external forces from entering the island chain.

The 2027 Deadline and What It Means

The Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military and security developments is unambiguous: China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027. The PLA continues to make steady progress toward that goal, developing capabilities explicitly designed for use against Taiwan – amphibious lift, long-range strike, joint firepower, and counter-intervention operations. According to the US Naval Institute, PLA developments in 2024 posed a significant threat to the United States, Taiwan, and other Indo-Pacific states.

The December exercises also included the first confirmed instance of PLA artillery reaching into Taiwan’s contiguous zone from positions in the Taiwan Strait’s median line area – threatening key ports including Kaohsiung with cheap artillery rather than expensive ballistic missiles. At one point during the exercises, a Taiwanese frigate, the Pan Chao, reported a Chinese destroyer locking its fire control radar onto the vessel. No shots were fired. But for several hours, the machinery of escalation sat visibly primed.

The Cognitive Warfare Dimension

Beyond live exercises, the PLA has intensified cognitive warfare operations against Taiwan. ISW-AEI researchers found dozens of spoofed AIS signals from PRC vessels that intermittently appeared and disappeared at the mouth of the Tamsui River in New Taipei from at least May 2023 through February 2026. Some signals carried the names of real China Coast Guard ships. No such ships entered Taiwanese internal waters – the signals were fabricated. The purpose is to degrade Taiwan’s threat awareness and normalize a sense of constant encirclement.

PLA cyber operations against Taiwan have also intensified dramatically. Over 1,000 percent increase in malicious cyber incidents against energy facilities was recorded in 2025. Attacks on hospitals and emergency services rose 54 percent. These operations are designed to weaken Taiwan’s crisis response and defense resilience in advance of any kinetic action.

What Deterrence Actually Requires

Taiwan’s defense spending plan of $40 billion over the next decade reflects the scale of the challenge it faces. Japan has taken the most significant regional steps to signal commitment, with Prime Minister Takaichi stating that a Taiwan contingency may qualify as a survival-threatening situation for Japan, triggering the right of collective self-defense. The Philippines has expanded coordination with Taiwan, including coast guard patrols in the Bashi Channel. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement has expanded US access to Philippine bases near Taiwan.

The fundamental question for the democratic world is whether these measures add up to deterrence that works. The answer depends on whether Xi Jinping believes the costs of military action against Taiwan are higher than the costs of continuing the current strategy of coercive attrition. Every time the international community fails to respond forcefully to PLA provocations – every time exercises are normalized rather than named as what they are – the calculation shifts slightly in Beijing’s favor. The buffer zone violations of December 2025 were a test. The democratic world’s response will shape what comes next.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *