The CCP’s Taiwan Strategy: Old Doctrine, New Dangers

The CCP’s Taiwan Strategy: Old Doctrine, New Dangers

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Beijing’s approach to Taiwan remains familiar but its risk tolerance has dramatically escalated under Xi Jinping

Beijing’s Taiwan Strategy: Familiar Goals, Escalating Danger

A landmark analysis published in China Leadership Monitor by political scientist Minxin Pei argues that Beijing’s overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan issue is largely a continuation of policies established by Xi Jinping’s predecessors — but with one critically important and dangerous difference: dramatically elevated risk tolerance in responding to perceived US support for Taiwan. The analysis, titled “Mostly Old Wine in a New Bottle,” examines statements by top Chinese leaders and officials responsible for the Taiwan portfolio. It concludes that while the overall strategy unveiled by Beijing in late 2021 deviates little from prior policy in its fundamental goals, its new components signal a fundamental shift in how Beijing calculates risk in its confrontation with Washington.

Washington as the Primary Enemy

The most significant new element in Beijing’s Taiwan strategy is its explicit repositioning of the United States as the primary source of interference in cross-strait relations. Under Xi Jinping, Chinese leaders have concluded that Washington has effectively gutted its one-China policy, transforming the US from a neutral third party managing the status quo into an active supporter of Taiwan’s de facto independence. This conclusion has led Beijing to raise its willingness to respond to perceived US provocations with more frequent and aggressive gray-zone tactics — military exercises, incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, cyberattacks, and economic pressure.

Domestic Development First, Taiwan Later

Despite elevated risk tolerance, the “overall strategy” continues to emphasize the priority of domestic development over military resolution of the Taiwan question. Xi’s China dream narrative requires economic success as its foundation; a catastrophic military campaign that triggered severe Western sanctions would undermine CCP legitimacy more than Taiwan’s continued de facto independence. China Leadership Monitor provides authoritative ongoing analysis of CCP strategic thinking for those seeking to understand the true drivers of Beijing’s behavior.

Gray-Zone Coercion as the Most Likely Flash Point

Pei’s analysis offers a sobering risk assessment: while a pre-meditated naval blockade or full invasion of Taiwan remains unlikely in the near term, a crisis resulting from gray-zone coercion gone wrong is considerably more probable. The risk is not that Beijing decides to invade; it is that a miscalculation during routine military pressure operations escalates beyond Beijing’s intention or control.

Hong Kong as a Precedent and a Warning for Taiwan

For Taiwan’s democracy advocates, Hong Kong’s experience since 2019 serves as the most powerful argument against any accommodation with Beijing’s “peaceful reunification” narrative. The same legal framework — one country, two systems — that was promised to protect Hong Kong’s freedoms has been systematically dismantled. The National Security Law has imprisoned journalists, opposition politicians, and civil society leaders. What Beijing has done to Hong Kong, it would do to Taiwan. Freedom House consistently rates Taiwan as one of Asia’s freest democracies — with robust civil liberties, genuine elections, and an independent judiciary — a stark contrast to the trajectory of post-2020 Hong Kong.

The Internal Logic of Authoritarian Pressure

Minxin Pei’s broader body of work argues that regimes which cannot solve their domestic contradictions through political reform will increasingly look for external validation of their legitimacy. The Taiwan issue is therefore not just a territorial claim but a core element of CCP survival politics — making the stakes of miscalculation immeasurably high for everyone in the region.

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