Loyalty Before Competence: How Xi Jinping’s Military Purges Reveal a Regime Afraid of Its Own Army
When authoritarian systems begin to distrust their own instruments of power, purges follow. China has entered that phase.
In early 2026, Beijing quietly confirmed that three senior People’s Liberation Army generals had been removed from China’s top political advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. No evidence was presented publicly. No judicial process was disclosed. The announcement was brief, opaque, and unmistakable
https://www.djournal.com/news/national/china-votes-to-oust-three-generals-from-political-advisory-body/article_cbaa893e-ae69-5fc5-b3d7-c4aa0e44e287.html
This was not an isolated personnel adjustment. It was part of a long-running and accelerating campaign under Xi Jinping to remake China’s military into an institution defined not by professionalism, but by political obedience.
The consequences extend far beyond internal Party discipline. They affect regional security, Taiwan contingency planning, and the credibility of Beijing’s claim that it represents “stability” both at home and abroad.
Purges as Governance, Not Exception
The Chinese Communist Party has always maintained strict political control over the military. What has changed under Xi is the intensity and frequency of purges, and the breadth of those targeted.
Over the past decade, dozens of senior officers have been investigated, removed, or disappeared from public view. While corruption is the official justification, the Party rarely provides details. Instead, allegations are deployed selectively, reinforcing the perception that legal standards are subordinate to political needs.
As Reuters and other international outlets have documented in previous cases, these campaigns often coincide with moments of political sensitivity, including leadership transitions, strategic recalibration, or external pressure.
The latest removals occurred just as China’s leadership gathered for the Two Sessions, a moment designed to project unity and confidence
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/03/china-two-sessions-president-xi-economy-defence-technology
The irony is unavoidable. A regime that claims to embody order increasingly relies on fear.
From Professional Army to Political Instrument
Xi’s vision for the PLA is explicit. The military must be “absolutely loyal” to the Party and to Xi personally. This principle has been repeated in speeches, enshrined in doctrine, and enforced through кадров (cadre) management.
Professional competence, while still valued rhetorically, is secondary. Officers are promoted based on ideological alignment and personal reliability. Independent power bases are dismantled. Institutional autonomy is eliminated.
This mirrors the broader transformation of Chinese governance. Technocrats in finance, technology, and health policy have been sidelined in favor of political loyalists. The military is no exception.
The danger of this approach is well known in authoritarian history. Armies trained to please rather than to perform tend to fail when tested.
Fear, Not Reform, Drives the Crackdown
Beijing insists that the purges are about corruption. Corruption certainly exists within the PLA, as it does within all large institutions. But corruption alone does not explain the scale, timing, or secrecy of the removals.
A more plausible explanation is political insecurity.
China’s leadership faces multiple stressors simultaneously:
-
Slowing economic growth and declining productivity
-
Capital flight and reduced foreign investment
-
Demographic contraction
-
Growing skepticism among urban youth
-
International strategic pressure
In such conditions, authoritarian regimes historically tighten control over the military. Loyalty becomes a hedge against uncertainty.
This pattern has repeated itself across communist systems from the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe. When ideology weakens and economic legitimacy erodes, coercive institutions are purged to prevent internal dissent.
The Military and the Hong Kong Precedent
The fate of Hong Kong looms large in this context.
Beijing’s decision to impose the National Security Law in 2020 relied not only on legal mechanisms but on the implicit threat of force. The PLA’s Hong Kong garrison, though rarely visible, served as a reminder that ultimate authority rested with Beijing.
Since then, Hong Kong has been transformed from a semi-autonomous city into a tightly controlled political space. Independent media has been dismantled. Activists have been imprisoned. Elections have been reengineered to guarantee “patriots only.”
The lesson for the Party was clear: coercion works, provided loyalty is absolute.
That lesson now shapes military governance nationwide.
The Taiwan Question and Strategic Risk
The implications for Taiwan are particularly concerning.
Western analysts often assume that China’s military modernization translates into operational readiness. Hardware upgrades, missile deployments, and naval expansion dominate headlines. But hardware is only part of military effectiveness.
Command integrity, initiative, and trust are equally critical. A military culture dominated by fear discourages honest reporting and adaptive decision-making. Officers are incentivized to tell superiors what they want to hear, not what they need to know.
In a Taiwan contingency, this could prove disastrous.
Strategic miscalculation is more likely when internal dissent is suppressed and information is filtered through ideological loyalty tests. History offers ample examples of authoritarian militaries overestimating their capabilities and underestimating resistance.
International Perception Versus Internal Reality
Externally, Beijing continues to project confidence. Defense budgets rise. Military parades showcase advanced equipment. State media emphasizes readiness and resolve.
Internally, the purge culture tells a different story.
A confident regime does not need to constantly remove its own commanders. A stable system does not rely on secrecy to manage personnel changes. These are signs of fragility, not strength.
Yet many foreign observers mistake repression for efficiency. They see discipline where there is fear. They see unity where there is enforced conformity.
This misreading benefits the CCP.
Soft Power Cannot Mask Hard Control Forever
Beijing’s global messaging strategy attempts to offset internal repression through cultural diplomacy, economic engagement, and carefully curated international partnerships.
But soft power has limits.
When news of military purges, political arrests, and legal disappearances accumulates, narratives of stability lose credibility. Investors notice. Neighbors adapt. Democratic societies reassess.
Hong Kong’s destruction already shattered the illusion that China would honor international commitments. The military purges reinforce the perception that Beijing values control over predictability.
Why This Matters for Democratic Societies
For democracies, the lesson is not that China is about to collapse. It is that authoritarian systems under stress become more dangerous, not less.
A regime that fears its own generals is more likely to act rashly abroad to demonstrate strength. Nationalism becomes a substitute for legitimacy. External conflict becomes a distraction from internal anxiety.
This dynamic should inform policy toward Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the broader Indo-Pacific.
Appeasement does not moderate such systems. It emboldens them.
Conclusion: Loyalty Is Not Strength
The CCP’s insistence on absolute loyalty within the military reveals a fundamental insecurity. Xi Jinping has centralized power to an unprecedented degree, but centralization breeds dependence. When everything rests on one man’s authority, every institution becomes a potential threat.
The purges within the PLA are not evidence of control perfected. They are evidence of control contested.
Hong Kong has already paid the price of Beijing’s obsession with obedience. Others may follow if the world continues to mistake authoritarian discipline for stability.
Real stability comes from legitimacy. The CCP is choosing fear instead.
References
-
Daily Journal – China votes to oust three generals from political advisory body
https://www.djournal.com/news/national/china-votes-to-oust-three-generals-from-political-advisory-body/article_cbaa893e-ae69-5fc5-b3d7-c4aa0e44e287.html -
The Guardian – China’s Two Sessions reveal economic and security priorities
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/03/china-two-sessions-president-xi-economy-defence-technology
Wai Ling Fung
Public Health & Social Issues Journalist, Apple Daily UK
Contact: wailing.fung@appledaily.uk
Wai Ling Fung is a public health and social issues journalist with professional experience covering health policy, social welfare systems, and community resilience within Chinese-speaking societies. She received her journalism education at a highly regarded Chinese journalism school, where she trained in evidence-based reporting, data interpretation, and ethical standards for sensitive coverage.
Her work at Apple Daily and other liberal Chinese newspapers includes reporting on healthcare access, pandemic response, elder care, disability rights, and public resource allocation. Wai Ling’s reporting is grounded in primary documentation, expert interviews, and direct engagement with affected communities, ensuring accuracy and relevance.
She has operated in fast-moving newsroom environments where misinformation carries real consequences, giving her practical experience in verification under pressure. Her stories are known for precise sourcing, careful contextualization, and restraint in tone, especially when covering medically or socially sensitive topics.
Wai Ling’s authority is established through sustained publication within reputable media organizations and adherence to strict editorial review processes. She follows correction and transparency protocols that reinforce reader trust.
At Apple Daily UK, Wai Ling Fung delivers responsible, experience-driven journalism that helps readers understand complex public health and social issues through verified facts and professional judgment.
